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Abstract
We argue a source of time-varying term premium (TVTP) in Japanese government bond market, and
show that it is interest rate smoothing that causes empirical failures of expectation theory of term
structure of interest rates. We estimate a regime switching ARCH model where an interest rate
smoothing regime can be identified. Based on a model of time-inconsistency by Missale and
Blanchard (1994), we further focus on a role of debt maturity in TVTP, which is an alternative to
an ARCH process.
Our robust empirical evidences support the expectation theory in Japanese government bond
market. Moreover, in comparison with the ARCH process, debt maturity turns out to be a reliable
proxy for the TVTP. This shows a possibility of debt management policy in Japan: fiscal authority
takes advantage of the debt maturity for price stability which is a target of monetary policy. It
sharply contrasts with an evidence for ineffectiveness of the U.S. debt management policy by
Wallace and Warner (1996).
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Introduction
Term structure of interest rates has been studied intensively, partly because this is a relatively accessible
area to study. In particular, expectation theory is attractive in simplicity. However, there remains an
empirical puzzle. A yield spread should not be theoretically a signiåcant variable in an equation of which
the dependent variable is an excess holding yield, but regression results show that, indeed, it is quite
signiåcant, which is a stylized fact in the G7 countries (Hardouvelis (1994)). A clue to the problem was
provided for us by a seminal work of Mankiw and Miron (1986), who have noted that central bank's
nominal interest rate smoothing policy increases a diéculty in predicting future rates.
Recently, from the viewpoint of Mankiw and Miron a number of researchers are trying to explain
causes of the puzzle (Rudebusch (1995), Fuhrer (1996), Balduzzi, Bertola and Foresi (1997), Balduzzi,
Bertola, Foresi and Klapper (1998), Roberds, Runkle and Whiteman (1996), Roley and Sellon (1996)).
Their interests are in the U.S. Federal Reserve, probably stimulated by an inçuential paper of Goodfriend
(1991). They are also at the årst stage, by which Campbell and Shiller (1991) means that each "thoroughly
explores the validity of the simple expectations theory before undertaking a detailed study of the source
of predictable time variation in excess returns." Indeed, these works thoroughly examine daily Federal
Funds rate and the target rate. They seem to result in predicting actual interest rate data successfully.
However, in order for us to draw a conclusion that the smoothing policy impedes the expectation
theory of term structure, time-varying term premium (afterwards TVTP) is indispensable. The fact is
ignored by the previous researches, more or less. Therefore, proceeding into the second stage as mentioned
by Campbell and Shiller (1991), we need to specify what is a source of the TVTP.
The TVTP has been dealt with by a time series analysis of autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) model, as represented by Bollerslev, Chou and Kroner (1992). Among some ARCH
applications, Engle, Lilien and Robins (1987) had the most inçuences on sequential researches. They
estimated an ARCH-M model, where a conditional variance is a determinant of current term premium,
concluding that term premium is far from time invariant. According to their estimation, once a conditional variance is included as a regressor, an eãect of the yield spread on the term premium certainly
becomes weaker. Yet, the spread is still signiåcant at a signiåcance levels 10%. It follows that in order
to recover the expectation theory, a role of an ARCH process is so limited.
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Therefore, we propose an alternative to the ARCH of understanding the TVTP. It is through debt
maturity, a hypothesis that is based on a model of time-inconsistency by Missale and Blanchard (1994).
Debt maturity is an instrument of debt management policy by åscal authority. The government has
originally an inçation bias stemming from an incentive to decrease the real debt burden. In order to
compensate for the real loss of holding a government bond, the public requires an inçation premium
for the return. What the government can do to prevent the nominal interest rate from increasing is to
shorten the debt maturity. That is because debt maturity would be a commitment of the government
against the inçation bias. As a result, depending on length of the debt maturity, the required inçation
premium would be reçected in the TVTP.
Thus, åscal authority can take advantage of the debt management for the purpose of price stability,
which is a target of monetary policy. Indeed, against the misalliance of both åscal and monetary policies,
there are some institutional devices which have contributed to åscal discipline. For example, the U.S.
Federal Reserve and the Treasury agreed on "the Accord" in 1951, and in the U.K., numerous indexed
bonds have been increasingly issued since the Thatcher's era. Contrary to such åscal discipline, there may
be quite enough room for the debt management policy in case of Japan, where the Ministry of Finance
has exercised its authority over both åscal and monetary aspects of the state. Consequently, Japanese
government bond market is likely to be inçuenced by the debt management policy. In other words, the
debt maturity may be a source of the TVTP in the market.
Based on another look at debt management above, we argue which source of the TVTP is signiåcant
in Japanese case, ARCH process or debt maturity. Taking into account the TVTP, moreover, we aim to
show that a reason for the empirical failure of expectation theory is interest rate smoothing.
Our methodology for these goals is somewhat roundabout because of a problem in Japanese data: the
Bank of Japan (thereafter BOJ) has never oécially announced a target rate of policy instrument, unlike
the Federal Reserve (Rudebusch (1995)). First, in order to identify when the BOJ had an intention to
smooth the nominal interest rate, we must rely on an index for interest rate smoothing, which we call
Yoshikawa index (Yoshikawa (1993)). Apart from the observations, next, we estimate a regime switching
ARCH model. The regressors are both a proxy for debt management policy and a yield spread. We
test a signiåcance of the yield spread in the term structure equation, considering a regime identiåcation.
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Finally, in order to conårm robustness of our estimation results, we compare the Yoshikawa index with
an estimated posterior probability of a smoothing regime.
As a result, a regime switching ARCH model is found to provide a good åt for Japanese government
bond data. Our robust empirical evidences support the expectation theory in term structure of interest
rates in the market. Moreover, an ARCH process turns out not to be necessarily an essential factor in
analyzing the TVTP, while the debt maturity must be a reliable proxy for the TVTP. The result coincides
with a time-inconsistency model of Missale and Blanchard (1994).
The plan of this paper is as follows: we begin in Section 1 a description of interest rate smoothing
policy, with an emphasis on Japanese experience. In Section 2, we provide a statistical basis for our
theory. We look at Japanese debt management policy in Section 3. Section 4 explains our empirical
method, a regime switching ARCH model, and its application to Japanese data. Finally, we discuss our
conclusion in Section 5.

1

Interest Rate Smoothing

Let us look at short-term interest rate in Japan. The policy instrument of the Bank of Japan (thereafter
BOJ) is oécially nominal rate of call money, which corresponds to the Federal Funds rate in the U.S.
In Figure 1, a dotted line illustrates the actual call rate since June 1958 and a thick solid line shows
our presumed target of the call rate, as later described in detail. We hereafter use monthly average rate
of collateralized overnight call money. We see an increased number of periods in the constant call rate
until the 1980's, probably due to some institutional regulations concerning to coordination and pricing 2 .
However, the call rate's steady movement around some åxed values also marks more months for the latter
periods, when there remains few regulations. It means that the smoothing phenomenon is not necessarily
stemming from the pricing regulations in the call money market.
Is the interest rate smoothing phenomenon peculiar to Japan? Bernanke and Mishkin (1992) made
some international comparisons of representative macroeconomic variables, concluding that Japan has
been the most successful among the other major countries in stabilizing nominal interest rates. Figure
2 The Federation of Bankers' Association of Japan (FBAJ) had arranged the call rate level from July 1957 to September
1967. Moreover, a quotation procedure for pricing, the so-called "Tatene," had been adopted from May 1961 to April 1979.
However, since the 1970's call money market has been considered as the most advanced in deregulation among Japanese
ånancial markets (Ito(1992)).
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1 may reçect the stabilizing policy by the BOJ. In addition, Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1997) estimate
policy reaction function in G3 (the U.S., Germany and Japan) countries since 1979, such as the form
rt = (1 Ä ö)rtÉ + örtÄ 1 + vt where actual and targeted nominal short-term interest rates are respectively
denoted by rt and rtÉ. Their estimates of coeécient örepresent a degree of interest rate smoothing. The
values are 0:92 in case of the Fed, 0:91 of the Bundesbank and 0:93 of the BOJ. Therefore, the BOJ has
certainly committed the smoothing policy at least to the same extent as the other central banks.

1.1

Japanese Index for Interest Rate Smoothing

Before moving to Japanese index for interest rate smoothing, we have to mention Japanese monetary
policy in general. Okina (1993) explains how Japanese daily market operation works from the point of
view of a central banker. In regard to its institutions, such as a lagged reserve maintenance system of
monthly unit or market operations through inter-bank lending markets, the system is the same as the
U.S. Fed 3 . Not surprisingly in terms of secrecy of central bank, there have been no publications of
target ågures of policy instruments in Japan. We have only "forecasts" of money supply growth (Cargill,
Hutchison and Ito (1997)). Consequently, in order to follow policy intention of the BOJ in each economic
phase, we must rely on another resource of policy decisions.
Fortunately, we can trace how and when the BOJ has made nominal interest rate smoothed, according
to Yoshikawa (1993). Yoshikawa introduces nominal wage rigidity of Taylor type into a model with
rational expectation like Goodfriend (1987) and Barro (1989). Monetary policy stances are there described
as two ways: 1) interest rate pegging or 2) active and 'dynamic' operation. When interest rate pegging
policy is taken in his model, both real output and price level become independent of money demand
shock. Moreover, the shock is one-to-one reçected in money supply. On the contrary, real output is then
aãected by independent change in money supply.
What Yoshikawa does is årst to group his whole sample into a pair of easy' and tight' money periods,
based on when the discount rate was årst either lowered or raised. Within each pair of period, next,
he plots monthly co-movement of call rate and other macroeconomic variables, such as money supply
(M2+CD), index of industrial production (IIP) and consumer price index (CPI). Finally, comparing the
3 However, to more extent than the FRB, Japanese monetary policy board has been nulliåed ever since its founding. In
response to such a criticism, amendment of the Bank of Japan Law has taken eãect in April 1997.
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observations with the above theoretical implications, he identiåes the concerned periods. As a result,
he found that, among his sample of 389 months from June 1958 at the beginning of the Iwato boom
to October 1990, there were 195 months during which the nominal interest rate was observably pegged.
These periods are illustrated at Table 1. Figure 1 also shows both actual and presumed target rates
Table 1: Yoshikawa Index
Beginnings
Dec. 1958
Dec. 1959
Aug. 1960
Feb. 1961
May 1963
Jul. 1964
Nov. 1965
Jan. 1969
Oct. 1969
Aug. 1972
Nov. 1974
Feb. 1976
Apr. 1978
May 1981
May 1987
3)
Sep. 1990
Aug. 1992
Feb. 1993
Oct. 1993
Oct. 1995

Ends
Nov. '59 2)
Jul. '60 2)
Jan. '61 2)
Jun. '61
Nov. '63
Dec. '64
May '67
Jun. '69
Sep. '70
Dec. '72
Mar. '75
Feb. '77
Mar. '79
Dec. '85
Mar. '89
Jun. '91
Jan. '93 2)
Aug. '93
Mar. '95
Aug. '96

Length of Months
12
8
6
5
7
6
19
6
12
5
5
13
12
56
23
10
6
7
18
11

Presumed Target Rates (%)1)
8.4
8.4
8.4
8.03
7.3
10.95
5.84
7.3
8.25 and 8.5
4.5
13
7
årst half of 4's
7 and årst half of 6's
3's
8
4
3
2
0.4

Notes: 1) The presumed target rates are not considered by the original paper Yoshikawa (1993). 2) Yoshikawa (1993)
separates successive periods in the same presumed target rates into two, the latter of which corresponds to a period when
the oécial discount rate change occurred in the beginning month. 3) The periods below the line are identiåed according to
level of the call rate itself, not the rules of Yoshikawa (1993), the sample of which is till October 1990. We automatically
choose them, that is, if the call rate çuctuates within less than Ü0:5% around our presumed target values during more than
3 months, then we select the period as that of interest rate smoothing.

according to "Yoshikawa index (afterwards YI)" as we have named it.

1.2

Diagnostic Experiments of Yoshikawa Index

In order to conårm a validity of the YI for the interest rate smoothing, let us submit the index to several
diagnostic experiments. There may be some doubt whether the index merely shows seasonality in the
interest rate. In regard to this doubt, Table 2 indicates monthly frequency of the index YI. We cannot
6

Table 2: Monthly Frequency of Yoshikawa index

Sample
Jun. '58 to Oct. '90 1)
Jun. '58 to Aug. '96 2)

Jan.
16
21

Feb.
17
22

Jun. '58 to Oct. '90 1)
Jun. '58 to Aug. '96 2)

1
1

1
2

1

1
1

Jun. '58 to Oct. '90 1)
Jun. '58 to Aug. '96 2)

Mar.
16
21

Apr.
14
18
1
1

3
4

The Number of Periods
May Jun. Jul. Aug. Sep.
17
16
15
16
16
21
20
18
20
19
The Number of Beginnings
3
1
2
3
1
3
1
The Number of Ends
1
2
1
1
1
3
1
2
1

Oct.
16
21

Nov.
18
23

Dec.
18
23

1
3

2
2

2
2

2
2

3
3

Notes: 1) The original sample in Yoshikawa (1993). 2) Our extended sample.

see any seasonal pattern in smoothing policy. We can conclude that the index does not have any seasonal
cycle property.
Indeed, let us inspect what the BOJ observed in, for example, a pair of easy and tight money periods
from May 1987 to June 1991. In Figure 2, a horizontal axis is measured by the call rate and a vertical
line is by an annual money supply (M2+CD) growth 4 . During May 1987 to May 1989, the call rate
stayed around 3% to 4%, while the M2+CD was volatile. Reading "Quarterly Economic Outlook" that
is a BOJ's oécial publication, we can see the BOJ was paying careful attention to price levels, which
were likely to reçect a series of incidents: 1) an unexpected appreciation in yen even after the Louvre
Agreement in Feb. 1987, 2) the Black Monday in Oct. 1987, 3) a steep increase in land prices from 1988
and 4) an introduction of the consumption tax in April 1989. For the latter periods of Sep. 1990 to
Jun. 1991, the call rate remained near 8% in spite of the M2+CD's oscillation. Similarly, the Quarterly
Economic Outlook then says that the BOJ inspected price levels, in order to calm fears of out-of-control
inçation. Thus, in both periods the BOJ was concerned about price levels, instead of seasonality in the
interest rate.
4 Yoshikawa

(1993) says,

May 1987 through March 1989 (23 months): The interest rate was basically pegged at 3%. Output growth
recovered from Ä1% (May 1987) to 11% (March 1988) and stayed high afterward. Throughout this period
inçation was very stable. Changes in the money supply therefore mainly reçected output shocks.
April 1989 through October 1990 (19 months): The interest rate was actively raised. Output growth
declined from 7% (May 1989) to zero (March 1990) but recovered to 8% (October 1990) again. Inçation was
stable at 3% during this period.
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Further, we examine another diagnostic experiment of the index. It is an empirical evidence of Takeda
(1996), which exploits an implication: velocity of money is more volatile in an interest rate smoothing
regime than otherwise. The implication is deduced from a model of Walsh (1984) and is also induced
from a careful observation of Goodhart (1989). Walsh (1984) showed that coeécients in money demand
function can depend on both variance of bond price and covariance between price level and bond price.
In his model, a money supply rule that allows greater çuctuation in bond price, as had been seen in
Chairman Volker's era of the U.S, would result in all the more increase in bond price volatility through
less interest-elastic money demand. On the other hand, Goodhart (1989) observed that velocity of
money is more stable during the periods of the endogenous money supply than otherwise. Based on
the implication, Takeda (1996) empirically showed that variance of the money velocity during the YI is
signiåcantly smaller than that in dynamic operation periods. In addition, the statistical signiåcance is
not true of any other index else than the YI, which is identiåed according to level of the call rate or
diãerence between the call and the oécial discount rates. The evidence shows the YI is a valid index for
the interest rate smoothing, even if we make use of another framework else than Yoshikawa (1993). We
will adopt the index in estimating term structure.

2

Time-Varying Term Premium

In this section we discuss a cause of empirical failure in expectation theory. Central to the problem is
the TVTP. In order to focus on a role of the TVTP, we wish to give a good account of the failure with
as simple a theory as possible. Accordingly, we take an example of one and two-period discount bonds.
We can easily extend our theory to a case of N-period coupon bonds, like government bond.
Each yield of two bonds are denoted by r and r (2) . Then, there is a relationship as follows:
(2)

rt

= í+ ïrt + (1 Ä ï)Et rt+1
rt+1 = Et rt+1 + èt+1 ;

where a term premium í is for the moment assumed to be constant. Expectation theory means that
ï=

1
2.

Arranging the above equation, we can get another equation where a dependent variable is an
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(2)

excess holding yield, rt Ä (2rt

Ä rt+1 ).
(2)

rt Ä (2rt

Ä rt+1 ) = Ä

í
2ïÄ 1 (2)
+
(r Ä rt ) + èt+1 :
1Äï 1Äï t

(1)

Similarly, expectation theory says a coeécient of the yield spread is 0. The left side in Equation (1)
means an excess return in a case of holding the two-period bond relative to rolling over the one-period
bond. As a consequence, expectation theory implies that the present yield spread cannot forecast an
excess holding return.
Now suppose the term premium is time-varying í= ít . Then, least square estimator of a coeécient
^ of the yield spread, r (2) Ä rt is,
å
t
^ ë 2ïÄ 1
å
1Äï

(2)

=
=

Cov(rt Ä (2rt

(2)

Ä rt+1 ); rt

Ä rt )
(2)
V ar(rt Ä rt )
Ä8õ2 (ít ) Ä 4öõ(ít )õ(Et Årt+1 )
:
4õ2 (ít ) + õ2 (Et Årt+1 ) + 4öõ(ít )õ(Et Årt+1 )

The notations õ2 (Å
) and õ(Å
) respectively mean variance and standard deviation. Et Årt+1 means Et (rt+1 )Ä
rt . öis a correlation coeécient between ít and Et Årt+1 .
Suppose õ2 (Et Årt+1 ) ! 1, then

^ = 0:
plimå

On the other hand, if an extreme smoothing policy makes the interest rate a martingale process, that
^ would turn out to be Ä2. The diãerence in the coeécient is
is õ2 (Et Årt+1 ) = 0, the coeécient å
what Mankiw and Miron (1986) empirically showed: volatility of the nominal short-term interest rate
was greater before 1914 when the Federal Reserve System was founded in the U.S., and estimate of the
spread's coeécient is signiåcantly equal to the theoretical value.
Moreover, a coeécient of the term premium Ä 1Ä1 ï does not depend on the degree of interest rate
smoothing, unlike that of the yield spread.
Ä

1
=
1Äï
=

(2)

Cov(rt Ä (2rt Ä rt+1 ); ít )
V ar(ít )
Ä2

If we can ånd some proxies for the TVTP, then an eãect of the variables on the excess holding yield
would be invariant to interest rate smoothing policy.
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Indeed, the above statistical theory shows that a cause of the empirical failure in expectation theory
lies in the interest rate smoothing policy. However, what is more important is that time variation of term
premium is a necessary condition for the empirical failure of the expectation theory 5 . Contrary to the
necessity, most of previous literature scrutinizing the Fed's market operation assumes a time invariant
term premium, for example Roberds, Runkle and Whiteman (1996). Even otherwise, Balduzzi, Bertola
and Foresi (1997) merely take into account a biweekly periodicity due to reserve maintenance periods.
Fuhrer (1996) also misunderstands regime switching in monetary policy stance as the time variation of
term premium, though each of them is a separate concept. Without doubt, it is not until specifying
sources of the TVTP ít that we can explain why the yield spread has signiåcant eãect on the excess
holding yield.

3

Another Look at Debt Management Policy

We will give a new view on the TVTP: debt maturity indicates the time variation. Before explaining the
hypothesis, we discuss government bond market in Japan. Figure 3 indicates each amount of domestic
government bonds classiåed by authorizing laws. Construction and special government bonds are authorized for the purposes of ånancing åscal expenditures and deåcits, respectively, while reånancing bond
is for redeeming previously issued bonds. Figure 3 shows that the reånancing bond has had a strong
tendency to rise rapidly since the 1990's. The Japanese Ministry of Finance (MOF) turns out to have
been faced with a diéculty in reånancing the bonds.
Meanwhile, Figure 4 shows a ratio of long-term coupon bonds since April 1981. The ågure is deåned
as a ratio of coupon bonds with maturity of 6, 10, 15, and 20 years, relative to all the market holding
stock of Japanese government bonds. Figure 4 indicates that while, until the årst half of 1990's, the ratio
has been cyclical through the peak to the trough, it has been decreasing markedly since 1993 by more
than 5%. The shortening of debt maturity structure is in progress.
Both ågures clearly capture a fact that in these years the Japanese MOF has intentionally replaced
the redeemed long-term bonds with the shorter term reånancing bonds. Why has the MOF adopted
such a debt management policy? One explanation is given by Missale and Blanchard (1994). The
5 McCallum (1994) showed in a rational expectation model, that even if the expectation theory itself is true, the reduced
form of term structure can deviate from what the theory predicts, when both the term premium is subject to AR (1)
process, and short-term interest rate operation is taken.
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model is entirely diãerent from a traditional literature of public debt management policy (Tobin (1963),
Friedman (1992), Roley (1982), Modigliani and Sutch (1966, 1967), Agell and Persson (1992)), because
it is concerned with a time-inconsistency problem pioneered by Barro and Gordon (1983).

3.1

Debt Maturity as a Commitment for Price Stability

We discuss Missale and Blanchard (1994) model brieçy. According to the model, government is supposed
to minimize its loss function associated with inçation, while the public responds to the government's
policy by forming expectations concerning inçation. The loss function at period t consists of three
parts: 1) costs of inçation, 2) output eãect from unexpected inçation and 3) distortion of taxation. The
government is also faced with an accumulation equation of debt, where real debt value depends on debt
maturity through unexpected inçation, given a spending and taxation decision. At the beginning of
period t, government inherits previous debt and decides the maturity of debt. The public forms their
rational expectation concerning inçation, based on their best knowledge including length of the maturity
the government has chosen. Finally, the government chooses a rate of inçation in the period.
In the repeated game situation, although the best outcome is clearly a zero-inçation equilibrium
achieved by a precommitment of the government, the outcome is time-inconsistent, not a Nash equilibrium. In order to attain the zero-inçation equilibrium for inånite horizons, the public's reputation for
the government would be suécient.
In order for the government to attain the årst best outcome, the government would solve for its problem
backward in time, conditional on the public's punishment: if the government cheats and brings about
unexpected inçation this period, in next period and on the public will take a time-consistent expectation
of inçation. Comparing a loss from the punishment with a once gain from the inçation, the government
must decide the debt maturity. Because the longer the debt maturity the higher is the incentive to inçate,
the maximum of debt maturity needs to be bounded so that the reputation equilibrium would be better
oã than a cheat equilibrium.
The maximum maturity is also a decreasing function of debt burden, because an increase in the debt
level means a larger reward from unexpected inçation and as a result, the government does not need
to increase the debt maturity. According to an empirical analysis in Missale and Blanchard (1994), an
adverse relation between average maturity and a ratio of debt to GDP is signiåcant in some countries
11

where debt overburden has been a problem, such as Ireland, Italy and Belgium.
Thus, the model shows that a decrease in debt maturity can be a signal for government's commitment
against inçating so as to depreciate the real debt burden. This implies that the government's commitment
for price stability would lower the public's inçation premium, which is inevitably required for nominal
government debt because of the inçation bias. The inçation premium is thought of as a part of the TVTP.
Consequently, the time variation of term premium is partly caused by the debt management policy, an
instrument of which is debt maturity. If Missale and Blanchard (1994) model åts into government's
behavior, then the debt maturity will be a proxy for the TVTP.

3.2

Japanese Evidence

We apply a few implications of Missale and Blanchard (1994) model to Japan, where as described above,
the MOF has been faced with the reånancing problem.
Figure 5 shows plots of the long-term debt ratio and a ratio of market holding government bonds to
nominal GDP. An adverse movement is revealed with a negative correlation of Ä0:57 in our whole sample
and Ä0:97 after 1993 when the long-term debt ratio has began to rapidly drop. The negative correlation
serves as an evidence in favor of Missale and Blanchard's theory. Similarly, Figure 6 shows plots of the
long-term debt ratio and GDP deçator measured as an annual growth rate. The plots indicate a nearly
positive relation, where correlation coeécients are 0:42 in our whole sample and 0:84 since 1993.
From these statistical facts, it is quite reasonable that especially since 1993, a role of government debt
maturity has been played in price stability in Japan, as Missale and Blanchard (1994) says. As a result,
the debt maturity can be a proxy for the TVTP in Japan. We will utilize the long-term debt ratio as an
independent variable in our regression of term structure.

4

Regime Switching Model

Now we are ready to estimate a term structure equation. What we should consider is, as described
above, two causes: 1) interest rate smoothing regime, and 2) debt maturity as a proxy for the TVTP.
^ in the
The statistical inference in Section 2 showed that a coeécient of the yield spread (estimate å)
regression would be diãerent, depending on which regime monetary policy lies in. In an extreme interest
rate smoothing regime, the coeécient would be equal to Ä2, while otherwise it would be signiåcantly 0.
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The feature leads us to adopt a regime switching model where an interest rate smoothing regime can be
identiåed.
In addition, we have to consider an eãect of the TVTP. Previous literature has taken into account an
ARCH process in error term (Engle, Lilien and Robins (1987)). In order to compare a relative empirical
performance between an ARCH process and debt maturity, we introduce an ARCH process into a regime
switching model.
Therefore, our method is a regime switching ARCH model where the long-term debt ratio is a regressor.
It is a simpliåed model of Markov regime switching ARCH model developed by Hamilton and Susmel
(1994) and applied by Cai (1994). The model can produce a posterior probability of each regime, which
will be an evidence to check the propriety of our index for smoothing YI.

4.1

Regime Switching Model of Term Structure

Our model is quite simple. Monetary policy consists of two regimes 0 or 1, where interest rate smoothing
policy is explicitly operated or otherwise, respectively. We call each regime smoothing and leavingalone afterwards. At the beginning of each period, the public expects where the present regime will
be, conditional on their best knowledge at that point. For simplicity, suppose that the public forms
expectation concerning regime every period in the same way: a probability of smoothing regime 0 is a
parameter ô independent of which regime is. We also assume that a disturbance in each regime follows
an i.i.d. normal distribution, N (0; 1). Moreover, in order to exploit an eãect of ARCH modeling within
our regime switching model, we allow the error term to have diãerent ARCH processes in each regime.
After all, the following is our model:
yt = x0t åSt + ut
ut =

p
ht vt

i:i:d:

vt ò N (0; 1)
ht = ç0 + ç1 St +

m
X

(ã0i + ã1i St )u2tÄ i

i=1

A coeécient åSt is diãerent in regime, denoted by St = 0; 1. The error term ut has an ARCH (m)
structure. The variance ht only depends on the present regime St . For example, a coeécient of utÄ i for
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i = 1; ÅÅÅm is ã0i if monetary policy lies in the smoothing regime this period, while ã0i + ã1i in case of
the leaving-alone regime.

4.2

Estimation

We estimate the regime switching ARCH model, where a dependent variable yt is an excess holding
period yield (afterwards EHPY). The data is calculated with a linearization method of Shiller (1990) 6 .
Figure 7 indicates the data. The statistics shows a low serial correlation of the EHPY 7 . Taking into
consideration the low correlation, we won't include lagged values of the EHPY among the regressors.
Meantime, our independent variables xt are a yield spread and the long-term debt ratio. The yield
spread (YS) is a diãerence between a long-term and a short-term yields. For each yield, we use a circulation yield of government bond with longest maturity, and a yield of three-month public and corporate
bonds with repurchase agreement (the so-called Gensaki), respectively. As described in Section 3, the
long-term debt ratio is deåned as a ratio of long-term government bond to all the market holding stock
of Japanese government bonds. It is an instrument of debt management policy, so that we abbreviate the
name to DM. Only for the DM variable, an Augmented Dickey Fuller test shows that we cannot reject
the non-stationarity 8 . Consequently, we diãerentiate the variable in the årst order to have a new series
ÅDM substituted for the raw data DM .
What we årst have to do is to choose our benchmark model. The candidates are two: a switchingARCH (1) or a switching-ARCH (2) 9 . In order to åx our AR order, we rely on Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC) and Schwarz Bayes Information Criterion (SBIC)

10

. These statistics (AIC, SBIC) are

(Ä263:19; Ä280:84) in case of ARCH (1), and (Ä267:73; Ä288:56) in ARCH (2). As a result, we select a
6 See

Appendix A. 2.
see Appendix A. 2.
8 See Appendix A. 3.
9 Switching-ARCH (3) model cannot converge even if we try some sets of appropriate starting values, so that we exclude
it from our benchmark model candidates.
10 We list the log likelihood function at Appendix B.
7 Also

14

benchmark switching-ARCH (1) model:
ö
å00 +å01 Y st
Ehyt =
å10 +å11 Y st
ut =
i:i:d:

vt ò

+å02 ÅDMt + ut
+å12 ÅDMt + ut

if regime = 0
if regime = 1

p
ht vt

N (0; 1)

ht =

ç0

+ç1 St

+(ã01 + ã11 St ) u2tÄ 1 :

We estimate the benchmark via a via maximum likelihood method. Then each monetary regime is
identiåed as either smoothing or leaving-alone, based on a restriction: in a regime 1, interest rate volatility
is more than in another regime 0, that is ç1 > 0. Owing to the identifying restriction, we can name a
regime 0 a smoothing regime.
In the process of estimating each model, we try to adopt some appropriate starting values so that
the estimation could converge after a ånite number of iteration. In principle, we use estimates of an
ordinary ARCH model without any switching. The exception is a coeécient å11 of the yield spread in
the leaving-alone regime 1. We set the value for 0, which would be somewhat in favor of the expectation
theory, as explained in Section 2. As for some parameters concerning switching, we apply a theory of
Walsh (1984) to the values; since in the leaving-alone regime volatility of interest rate would be more
than in the smoothing one, the parameters ç1 and ã11 should be positive. Consequently, we give them
a small positive number 0:01. Finally, for the probability ô of the smoothing regime, we substitute a
sample frequency of months in the smoothing regime, judging from the YI, that is

131
184 .

In the following results, parenthesis includes standard error of each variable, and Émeans a variable

is signiåcant at a 5% signiåcance level.
8
0:0022 +7:65 Y st
>
>
<
(0:0067)
(1:83)É
Ehyt =
Ä0:0048 +0:95 Y st
>
>
:
(0:011)
(3:66)
ht =

ô=

0:00026 +0:0052 St
(0:00017) (0:0012)É

+6:60 ÅDMt + ut
(1:47)É
Ä1:35 ÅDMt + ut
(2:46)

if regime = 0
if regime = 1

+(0:18 Ä 0:093St ) u2tÄ 1
(0:14) (0:28)

0:385121:
(0:098)É

The estimation tells us some interesting points. In the term structure equation, we can ånd a sharp
contrast between each regime. In the smoothing regime, both the yield spread and the long-term debt
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ratio are signiåcant, while in the leaving-alone regime neither accounts for the excess return. In particular,
the coeécients of both variables in the smoothing regime are signiåcantly larger than 2, a value that our
theory in Section 2 predicts. On the other hand, the conditional variance equation ht does not have a
signiåcant variable, except for a constant term which depends on the regime. The positive eãect means
that the leaving-alone regime creates more volatility of interest rates than the smoothing one does, a
result that agrees with a theory of Walsh (1984) and a stylized fact by Goodhart (1989). The ex ante
probability ô of the smoothing regime 0 is also signiåcantly estimated to be around 39%. However, the
value is unexpectedly lower than an average percentage 71%, a ågure that we can count from the YI.

4.3

Result

Next, we further select a model through likelihood ratio test, within some nested models of our benchmark.
Each of them corresponds to a case among any combinations, depending on whether it is with or without
an ARCH process (that is, ã01 = 0; ã11 = 0), whether there is any switching or not in the ARCH process
(ã11 = 0), whether there is any switching or not in constant terms of the ARCH process (ç1 = 0), and
whether there are any switching or not in a term structure (å00 = å10 ; å01 = å11 ; å02 = å12 ). The
combination amounts to twelve cases including the benchmark model. In addition, in order to reconårm
the validity of the long-term debt ratio as a proxy for term premium, whether there are any debt maturity
eãects or not (å02 = 0; å12 = 0) is examined separately. Accordingly, besides the benchmark, we prepare
twelve nested models in total.
The likelihood ratio test shows that in comparison with the benchmark, we can reject nine nested
models at a signiåcance level 10%. There remain three cases which cannot be rejected: case 1) no
switching in the ARCH process; case 2) neither switching in the ARCH process nor in the term structure;
and case 3) without the ARCH process. Not surprisingly, the rejected models include a case where the
long-term debt ratio is excluded. Table 3 indicates the results of likelihood ratio test and estimates of each
parameter. For reference, as well as three cases, it contains the rejected case 4) without the long-term
debt ratio.
Now let us summarize our results:
1. A constant term in the ARCH process signiåcantly changes according to monetary regime. The
ågure in the leaving-alone regime 1 is higher than in the smoothing regime 0. It reçects higher
16

Table 3: Comparison of Alternative Models
Parameter
ç0
ç1
ã01
ã11
å10
å11
å12
å00
å01
å02
ô
Log Likelihood
Likelihood Ratio
p-value

Benchmark
0.00026
(0.00017)
0.0052
(0.0012)É
0.18
(0.14)
-0.093
(0.28)
-0.0048
(0.011)
0.95
(3.66)
-1.35
(2.46)
0.0022
(0.0067)
7.65
(1.83)É
6.60
(1.47)É
0.39
(0.098)É
252.19

Case 1
0.00027
(0.00017)
0.0050
(0.00096)É
0.15
(0.087)É

-0.0052
(0.011)
1.29
(3.56)
-1.26
(2.36)
0.0024
(0.0068)
7.55
(1.85)É
6.62
(1.46)É
0.38
(0.096)É
252.14
0.11
(0.74)

Case 2
0.000021
(0.000023)
0.0047
(0.00069)É
0.19
(0.097)É

-0.0064
(0.0023)É
5.66
(0.84)É
4.33
(0.73)É
0.23
(0.065)É
249.07
6.24
(0.18)

Case 3
0.000078
(0.000046)É
0.0051
(0.00064)É

-0.0033
(0.0096)
3.21
(2.46)
0.56
(1.68)
-0.00087
(0.0031)
7.32
(0.91)É
7.57
(0.81)É
0.20
(0.051)É
251.26
1.87
(0.39)

Case 4
0.00019
(0.00014)
0.0043
(0.00072)É
0.0027
(0.019)
0.19
(0.17)
-0.0076
(0.0092)
2.62
(2.41)

0.0072
(0.0055)
7.28
(1.50)É

0.22
(0.066)É
249.10
6.18
(0.045)

Notes :
1) É shows that a variable is signiåcant at a signiåcance level 5%. 2) Each case corresponds to the following restrictions:

case 1) no switching in the ARCH process; case 2) neither switching in the ARCH process nor in the term structure; case
3) without the ARCH process; and case 4) without the long-term debt ratio.
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volatility of interest rate in the former regime than in the latter. However, the ARCH process itself
does not show any switches in regime.
2. The public's prior probability ô of the smoothing regime 0 is estimated at 20% to 39%. The
probability is extremely low, compared with the YI.
3. As for the expectation theory, we are quite successful in recovering the empirical evidence. The
coeécients å11 of the yield spread in the leaving-alone regime 1 are not signiåcant in all the cases.
On the contrary, all the coeécients å01 in the smoothing regime 0 are signiåcant. This robust
evidence strongly shows that a lot of the empirical failures in the expectation theory plausibly
result from ignoring a monetary regime switching.
4. As explained in Section 2, even if we take into account the TVTP, the eãect of the debt maturity
would not be diãerent in regime. The theoretical value is 2 in both regimes. Concerning this point,
our estimates show a complicated result. In the leaving-alone regime 1, we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the coeécient å12 is equal to 2, while in the smoothing regime 0 we can clearly
reject the null å02 = 2. It may suggest that there remains a problem.
5. The case 3 without the ARCH process is not rejected against the benchmark model. Previous
literature has treated the TVTP as an ARCH process, typically seen in Engle, Lilien and Robins
(1987). However, this result says that the ARCH process is not crucial for modeling a time variation
in term premium. Interestingly, the conclusion is agreed with by Cai (1994) who worked with the
U.S. data.
6. On the contrary, the debt maturity turns out to be indispensable for the term structure. The case
4 where the long-term debt ratio is omitted, is statistically rejected against our benchmark model.
It clearly contrasts with an analysis of the U.S. by Wallace and Warner (1996). They estimate a
simple GARCH model, and cannot detect any signiåcant relations between the U.S. Federal debt
maturity and the excess holding period yield. Wallace and Warner's results may be interpreted as an
evidence of ineãective debt management policy in the U.S., from a viewpoint of time-inconsistency
problem of Missale and Blanchard (1994). The diãerence between the U.S. and Japan seems to be
related to an independence of central bank. Further research will be required.
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4.4

Posterior Probability of Regimes

The estimation above produces a by-product, a posterior probability of each regime. The probability is
given, as described above, based on an identifying restriction: volatility of interest rate is more in the
leaving-alone regime than in the smoothing one. Even if the estimation result supports our hypothesis:
the interest rate smoothing policy is responsible for persistent empirical failures in the expectation theory,
then the validity would be weakened by our incorrect identiåcation of regimes. Therefore, we have to
examine whether the probability coincides with the YI.
The posterior probability can be easily calculated in our simpliåed model

11

. Figures 8-11 indicate

posterior probabilities of the smoothing regime 0 in each case. In each ågure, a shaded area on an upper
horizontal axis shows that the months belong to the smoothing regime of the YI, while a shaded area on
a lower axis mean the leaving-alone regime. Obviously, the posterior probability is so volatile that it does
not look steady around a åxed level for a while

12

. However, both Figure 10 and 11 show some striking

diãerences in the probability between peaks and troughs. Making use of this feature, a tendency to stay
near a zero probability is adopted as our criterion of the leaving-alone regime. Similarly, a tendency to
stay up at a higher probability is our criterion of the smoothing regime.
In terms of the criteria, we observe ågures of the posterior probability. In Appendix C, we chronologize
what Figures 8-11 indicate, following dates of the YI. Summing up the chronology, we may consider the
posterior probability to approximately grasp the YI. To be concrete, the whole cases are clustered into
two classes: the benchmark and the case 1 often give us the probability which åts into the smoothing
regime only, while the cases 2 and 3 mostly coincide with the leaving-alone regime only. It seems to
reçect a diãerence in the estimated probability of the smoothing regime between the former (39% and
38%) and latter cases (23% and 20%), as seen in Table 3.
11 See

Appendix B.
regime identiåcation is somewhat dissatisfactory. It seems to be due to both the YI and our switching regime ARCH
model. For the former, another approach will be replaced. Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1997), for example, estimate stochastic
processes of both actual interest rate and the targeted rate vis a vis GMM. On the other hand, the latter problem will be
solved by a Markov regime switching model. Instead, we assumed that an ex ante probability of a regime is independent of
which regime is. The simpliåcation would make state partition all the coarser. Both approaches will hold value.
12 Our
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5

Conclusion

Our robust empirical evidences support the expectation theory in term structure of interest rates in
Japanese government bond market. It sharply contrasts with so many previous researches concerning the
G7 countries. What is new in our analysis is both a switching in regimes of monetary policy and a role
of debt maturity in time-varying term premium (TVTP). Our switching-ARCH model gives a posterior
probability of a smoothing regime, which is reasonable in terms of an anecdotal Yoshikawa Index (YI)
(Yoshikawa (1993), Walsh (1984), Goodhart (1989)). Moreover, in comparison with an ARCH process
(Engle, Lilien and Robins (1987), Cai (1994)), the debt maturity turns out to be a reliable proxy for the
TVTP (Wallace and Warner (1996)).
In our interpretation, the debt maturity of government plays a role in achieving a reputation equilibrium with price stability, instead of the so-called inçation bias (Missale and Blanchard (1994)). The
optimal equilibrium contributes to lowering investors' inçation premium required for the government
bond rate. Because the premium is reçected in the TVTP, the debt maturity would be a proxy for the
TVTP after all. The inference is supported by our evidences concerning a long-term debt ratio in Japan.
This shows a possibility of a debt management policy in Japan: for price stability which is a target of
monetary policy, åscal authority takes advantage of the debt maturity. However, it seems to be impossible
in the U.S. and the U.K. bond markets, because in 1951 the Federal Reserve and the Treasury agreed on
"the Accord" in the U.S., and numerous indexed bonds have been increasingly issued since the Thatcher's
era in the U.K. As an evidence for the ineãectiveness of the U.S. debt management policy, Wallace and
Warner (1996) cannot detect any signiåcant relations between the Federal debt maturity and the excess
holding period yield.
Such a debt management based on a model of time-inconsistency is an ordinary phenomenon in each
country? Some governments conduct it forcefully, like the Japanese Ministry of Finance; others cannot do
institutionally like the U.S. Treasury or practically like the U.K. one. How about another country? The
question is an important issue, which is closely related to an independence of central bank. It remains a
further research.
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A

Data Appendix

A.1

Data Description
Table 4: Data Description

Government Bond

Amount of both long and medium-term coupon bonds, and discount bond,
excluding that of both underwriting by the Trust Fund Bureau and subscription
by the BOJ. Measured in a hundred million yen. Sample from May '81 to Feb. '96,
total 178 months.
Source: Monthly Report of Public and Corporate Bonds (the Bond Underwriting
Association), cited by Annual Statistical Report of Securities (the Tokyo Stock
Exchange).

Long-Term
Government Bond

Amount of 6, 10, 15 and 20-year maturity bonds. Measured in a hundred
million yen. Sample from May '81 to Feb. '96, total 178 months.
Source: Monthly Report of Public and Corporate Bonds (the Bond Underwriting
Association), cited by Annual Statistical Report of Securities (the Tokyo Stock
Exchange).

Long-Term Yield

A circulation yield of government bond with longest maturity at the end of
month (the Tokyo Stock Exchange）. Sample from Mar. '77 to Feb. '96, total
228 months.
Source: Monthly Report of Public and Corporate Bonds (the Bond Underwriting
Association).

Short-Term Yield

A yield of 3-month public and corporate bonds with repurchase agreement
at the end of month. Sample from Mar. '77 to Feb. '96, total 228 months.
Source: Monthly Statistical Economic Report (the Bank of Japan).

A.2

Estimate of Excess Holding Period Yield

We calculate our dependent variable, an excess holding period yield, according to a linearization method
of Shiller (1990)

13

.

A holding period return on a bond hi (t; t0 ; T ) is a return at present t over some holding period t0 Ä t
less than the bond's maturity T Ä t. The subscript i means that the bond is a par bond i = p or a
discount bond i = d. An excess holding period return àh;i (t; t0 ; T ) is deåned as a diãerence between an
expected holding period yield Et hi (t; t0 ; T ) and a spot rate ri (t; t0 ).
13 Campbell,

Lo and MacKinlay (1997) is also familiar with some basic concepts of a åxed-income security.
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Meanwhile, the holding period yield is represented in terms of duration Di (Å
):
hi (t; t0 ; T ) =

Di (T Ä t)ri (t; T ) Ä [Di (T Ä t) Ä Di (t0 Ä t)]ri (t0 ; T )
:
Di (t0 Ä t)

We also approximate a long-term bond like government bond, as a par bond with an inånite maturity.
Further, assuming that an investor's holding period is inånitesimal t0 = t + 1, we get rp (t; t + 1) ô
rd (t; t + 1): By deånition, a duration Dp (1) is a reciprocal of a spot rate rp (t; 1).
From these deånitions and approximations, we can have a formula of the excess holding period yield
as follows:
àh;p (t; t + 1; 1) = Et hp (t; t + 1; 1) Ä rd (t; t + 1)
hp (t; t + 1; 1) =
=

Dp (1)rp (t; 1) Ä [Dp (1) Ä Dp (1)]rp (t + 1; 1)
Dp (1)
rp (t + 1; 1)
1 + rp (t + 1; 1) Ä
:
rp (t; 1)

For the above formula, we substitute actual data of Japan. We use a circulation yield of Japanese
government bond with longest maturity for the long-term yield rp (t; 1)

14

. As for the short-term yield

rd (t; t + 1), supposing that one period corresponds to three months, a rate of three-month bond with
repurchase agreement (the so-called Gensaki) is adopted.
Figure 7 indicates our data of the excess holding period yield. Table 5 also shows some univariate
statistics of the excess holding period yield. The details of our data are described in Appendix A. 1 Data
Table 5: Statistics of Excess Holding Period Yield
Mean
0.0051
Order 1st
0.067

2nd
0.073

Standard Deviation Skewness Kurtosis
0.062
-0.15
1.30
Serial Correlations
3rd
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th
-0.10 -0.22 -0.082 -0.062 -0.11 0.058 0.087

10th
0.10

Description.
14 We have another data for the long-term yield: an over-the-counter tone ågure. Even if we substitute this for the
circulation yield, our results turn out not to be essentially altered.
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A.3

Unit Root Test

We test stationarity of all the variables, which is needed for precluding spurious causation in our estimation. We run an Augmented Dickey Fuller test, where a signiåcance of the coeécient ömatters in the
following equation:
Åyt = ñ+ åt + öytÄ 1 + ã1 ÅytÄ 1 + ÅÅÅ+ ãp ÅytÄ p + ut :
The results are shown in Table 6. Regardless of the number p of lag order, we cannot reject the
non-stationarity of a variable DM . Consequently, in our empirical analysis we use a diãerence of årst
order ÅDM .
Table 6: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test
Variable
EHY
YS
DM

p=0
Ä13:7ÉÉ
Ä2:8
Ä2:2

p=1
Ä9:6ÉÉ
Ä2:6
Ä2:1

p=2
Ä9:0ÉÉ
Ä3:3É
Ä2:3

p=3
Ä9:6ÉÉ
Ä3:4ÉÉ
Ä2:2

p=4
Ä8:4ÉÉ
Ä3:2É
Ä1:9

Note: ÉÉand Éshow a rejection of the null hypothesis H0 : ö= 0 at signiåcance levels of 5% and 10%, respectively.
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B

Log Likelihood Function and Posterior Probability

As in the text, we assume that our model is two-regime switching ARCH (1), where a disturbance follows
an i.i.d. normal distribution. Let the regime at date t be indexed by an unobserved random variable
St = 0; 1. We also suppose that a probability ô of a regime switching is independent of which regime is.
A vector íparenthesizes all the concerned parameters.
Then, a density of yt conditional on St = j and StÄ 1 = i is
0

2

(yt Ä x åS )
t
t
1
2ht
f (yt jSt = j StÄ1 = i ; í) = p p expÄ
:
2ô ht

A joint density-distribution function of yt , St and StÄ 1 is also
P (yt ; St = j; StÄ 1 = i ; í) = f (yt jSt = j; StÄ 1 = i ; í)P (St = jjStÄ 1 = i; í)P (StÄ 1 = i ; í);
where under our assumption,
P (St = jjStÄ 1 = i; í) = P (St = j ; í) = ô; f or j = 0; 1:
Summing the joint density functions bears a density function of yt ,
f (yt ; í) =

1 X
1
X

P (yt ; St = j; StÄ 1 = i ; í):

j=0 i=0

Substituting those for the density function of yt , we obtain a log likelihood function,
L(í) =

T
X

log f (yt ; í):

t=1

Similarly, a posterior probability of a regime is easily attained as follows:
P (St = j jyt ; í)

=
=
=

P (yt ; St = j ; í)
f (yt ; í)
P1
j=0 P (yt ; St = j StÄ 1 = i ; í)
P1

P1

f (yt ; í)

f (yt jSt = j; StÄ1 = i; í)P (St = jjStÄ 1 = i; í)P (StÄ 1 = i; í)
:
P1
j=0
i=0 f (yt jSt = j; StÄ 1 = i; í)P (St = jjStÄ 1 = i; í)P (StÄ 1 = i; í)
i=0
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C

Comparison of Posterior Probability and Yoshikawa Index
1. 1981-Dec. '85:
During this period in the smoothing regime, both Figures 8 and 9 show persistently high probability.
2. '86-Apr. '87:
Figures 8 and 9 also clearly grasp a switch from the smoothing to the leaving-alone regimes. Moreover, Figures 10 and 11 show nearly zero probability in the leaving-alone regime. Especially in
Figure 11, the probability levels out at zero during most of the period.
3. May '87-Mar. '89:
Although the YI indicates the smoothing regime then, neither ågure åts absolutely into the YI.
However, all the ågures show a sharp increase in the probability at the end of the period.
4. Apr. '89-Aug. '90:
Figure 10 grasps a switch from the smoothing to the leaving-alone regimes. The ågure also shows
nearly zero probability in the leaving-alone regime. Moreover, in Figure 11 the probability levels
out at zero for åve successive months.
5. Sep. '90-Jun. '91:
In the short period, we can see a heap in all the ågures. It tells us that all the ågures åt well into
the smoothing regime of the YI.
6. Jul. '91-Jul. '92:
In the same way as in the previous leaving-alone periods, Figure 10 shows nearly zero probability
in the leaving-alone regime.
7. Aug. '92-Jan. '93, Feb. '93-Aug. '93 and Oct. '93-Mar. '95:
In spite of the smoothing regime, neither ågure åts into the YI.
8. Apr. '95-Sep. '95:
In all the ågures, there is a rapid drop of the probability. Moreover, Figures 10 and 11 show
persistently low probability in the leaving-alone regime. Especially in Figure 11 the probability
levels out at zero for three successive months.
25

9. Oct. '95-Aug. '96:
In spite of the smoothing regime, neither ågure åts into the YI.
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